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CHEMICAL OBVIOUSNESS AND 35 U.S.C. § 103
Recent trends in chemical research threaten to make obsolete the statutory
scheme under which patentability of new chemical compounds is determined This
Note examines the current interpretation of the nonobviousness requirement of the
1952 Patent Act, 35 U.S. C § 103, as well as the underlying rationalesfor the inter-
pretation This Note also examines the application of legalstandards ononobvious-
ness in cases involving chemical compounds structurally similar to prior art
compounds. Recent trends in chemical synthesis are examined where chemical
properties are correlated with chemicalstructure. The Note concludes that the court
must reexamine its traditional analysisfor resolving questions in light of these recent
scientfc trends.
INTRODUCTION
SocIETY is becoming increasingly dependent on chemical
compounds which are used, for example, as pharmaceuticals,
fuels, and detergents. Only a few new chemical compounds are
marketed each year, however, because chemical companies, seek-
ing to recoup substantial investments in the research and develop-
ment of these compounds, desire limited monopolies for their
discoveries through patent protection. This Note will discuss both
the statutory requirements of patentability which govern these
chemical inventions and the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals' interpretation of the current statutory scheme.
Chemical compounds are defined as compositions of matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101' and are patentable only if they meet the
statutory requirements of utility,2 novelty,3 and nonobvious-
ness.4 Assume, for example, that a chemist synthesizes a com-
pound that is structurally similar5 to compounds disclosed in the
1. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
2. Id.
3. Id. § 102.
4. Id. § 103.
5. For the purpose of this Note, the phrase "structurally similar" should be construed
broadly to include such compounds as homologues and isomers (geometric and stereo) of
the prior art compounds.
A series of compounds in which each member differs from the next member
by a constant amount is called a homologous series, and the members of the series
are called homologs. The family of alkanes (methane, CH4; ethane, CH3CH3;
propane, CH3CH2CH3; etc) forms such a homologous series, the constant differ-
ence between successive members being CH2.
R. MORRISON & R. BOYD, ORGANIC CHEMISTRY 80 (3d ed. 1975).
Isomers are different chemical compounds that have the same molecular formula. Ste-
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prior art.6 If this chemist then satisfies the statutory requirements
of novelty and utility, the central issue in determining patentabil-
ity becomes one of obviousness. In addressing this issue, this Note
will focus on the standard of obviousness applicable to patent
claims for chemical compounds in which structurally related
chemical compounds are disclosed in the prior art.7 This Note
also will discuss the obviousness problem from a legal" and chem-
ical9 perspective. The mechanical background' ° and historical
tests of chemical obviousness," as well as the policies' 2 and un-
derlying rationale 3 of the nonobviousness requirement also will
be reviewed. This Note then will conclude that recent develop-
ments 4 in the chemical field may make the current interpretation
of the nonobviousness requirement obsolete.'5
I. THE STANDARD OF OBVIOUSNESS
A. The Legal Problem
If a chemical compound meets the statutory requirements of
patentability, the United States Patent Office will grant a composi-
tion of matter patent. This patent seeks to prevent unauthorized
persons from synthesizing the compound for use or sale and po-
tentially subjects such infringers to liability to the patentee.' 6 Fur-
thermore, a composition of matter patent protects the patentee
from all infringers on all uses, even if it is discovered later that the
compound has additional uses which were not known initially."
A composition of matter claim, therefore, seems to offer the paten-
tee unjustified "windfall" protection, such that it would be better
reoisomers differ only in the way their atoms are oriented in three dimensional space. Id. at
115.
Geometric isomers differ because of their configuration around a multiple bond.
Cis-2-butene and trans-2-butene, for example, are geometric isomers. Id. at 148-49.
6. For a discussion of what constitutes prior art, see generally I & 2 D. CHISuM,
PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT
3.04-.08, 5.03[31 (1978).
7. See notes 77-167 infra and accompanying text.
8. See notes 16-22 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 23-26 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 27-47 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 77-167 Myra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 48-60 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 61-76 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 168-73 hira and accompanying text.
15. See notes 169-78 infra and accompanying text.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1976).
17. Kitch, The Nature and Function ofthe Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269
(1977).
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to limit the grant to the "use" patent." The use patent only pre-
vents others from using the compound for the claimed use and
thus individual users, of which there may be many, constitute the
class of infringers. The pursuit of individual users, however, is a
cumbersome and inadequate remedy. 9 From the patentee's
standpoint, therefore, the broad composition of matter patent is
more desirable than the "use" patent.20
Under the current interpretation of section 103 in the chemical
area, if the chemical compound's structure resembles those chemi-
cal compounds disclosed in the prior art, the claimed compound
may be deemed prima facie obvious and therefore unpatentable
unless the patent claimant rebuts the prima facie showing.2 The
claimant may so rebut by proving that the claimed compound's
properties were unexpected in light of prior art disclosures.22 If,
however, the properties of the claimed compound could be pre-
dicted quantitatively in light of the prior art, the chemical com-
pound would be unpatentable under the current interpretation of
section 103.
B. The Chemical Problem
A synthetic chemist generally is concerned with the synthesis
of new and useful chemical compounds. The chemist's problem
usually involves synthesizing one or more of a series of com-
pounds, each designed for a specific use. The following simplified
fact pattern will highlight this problem. The chemist is assigned
to synthesize chemical compounds which possess a desirable char-
acteristic A and no undesirable characteristics. Suppose the
chemist knows of a compound X that possesses the desirable char-
acteristic A and undesirable characteristics. The chemist's task is
to modify compound X to maintain or enhance the desirable char-
acteristic A while minimizing or eliminating the undesirable char-
acteristics. To avoid a total loss of the desirable characteristics,
the chemist will synthesize compounds that are structurally simi-
lar to compound X. The chemist knows that minor changes in
physical characteristics will most likely accompany the minor
changes in chemical structure. These ideas constitute the tech-
18. See id See also Sease, Chemical Properties: Are They a Sensible Legal Yardstick
of Patentability?, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 39 (1976-1977).
19. Id. at44.
20. Id. at 45.
21. See notes 119-67 infra and accompanying text.
22. See In re Stemniski, 444 F.2d 581 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
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nique of molecular modification which is embedded in the chem-
ist's approach to the solution of this problem.3
The chemist who utilizes the molecular modification approach
to solve chemical problems generally knows the two dimensional
representation of the chemical compound which is the object of
the synthesis. In some cases, the chemist also may know a reason-
able synthesis for the creation of the novel chemical compound. It
is generally not known with absolute certainty, however, whether
that synthesis will create the desired compound or whether the
compound, once created, will possess the desired physical proper-
ties. The chemist may expect that a compound will possess a cer-
tain property or class of properties, but he or she cannot predict
accurately or quantitatively the extent to which the compound will
possess these properties. The chemist, therefore, is generally not
surprised if testing reveals that the compound either does or does
not possess the desired properties. Thus, from our hypothetical
chemist's standpoint, nothing is certain before the chemical com-
pound is tested; nothing is obvious.
23. This strategy has been defended as one of the most useful approaches to new drug
design:
One of the most serious current problems in preclinical research aimed at the
identification of new compounds of biological significance is the indictment heard
from regulatory agencies and from some segments of the scientific community
that the medicinal chemist's efforts are usually trivial molecular manipulations
rather than basic investigations. This concern has been discussed in many set-
tings and except for the intensity and persistence of the attacks on medicinal
chemists in the pharmaceutical industry, it would seem fatuous to discuss the bio-
logical significance of minute variations in molecular structure. The molecular
defect in sickle cell disease, is subtle enough that the mechanism of this politically
sensitive disorder should have persuaded those who doubted the importance of
minor variations in molecular structure. The presence of a single methyl group
which makes the molecule of codeine different from that of morphine should offer
to politically-sensitive critics a persuasion of the importance of small structural
differences. In the preclinical phase where there is a steady feedback between the
chemist and the biologist as the former proceeds with molecular manipulation,
the difficulty, of course, is the ill-defined relationship between structure and func-
tion. This difficulty is exaggerated by the specific interspecies and individual in-
traspecies differences in animal test systems. There is no way for the chemist to
know when he undertakes the synthesis of a new molecule, whether he will be
accused of a trivial effort or praised for a biological breakthrough. Indeed the
chemist tends to be pleased if his minor modification has not entirely destroyed
the molecule's biological activity. Since, however, there is no more effective test
system available than the animal model, we continue to deal with the cumulative
uncertainties of molecular manipulation and variation in species response. It is,
however, this very high degree of uncertainty which creates the problem. It seems
to me, therefore, that the explanation of the attack by spokesmen of regulatory
agencies upon molecular manipulation must be sought outside of the realm of
science.
Hubbard, Preelinical Problems of New Drug Development, in REGULATING NEw DRUGS
35, 41 (R. Landau ed. 1973).
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Suppose, however, that our chemist has discovered a new
chemical compound that solves this chemical problem. The new
compound possesses the desired characteristic A, exhibits no un-
desirable characteristics, and is structurally similar to the original
compound. The question, therefore, is whether the compound is
patentable. Because of current court interpretations of 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, the solution to this chemical problem may not give rise to a
patentable invention.24 Furthermore, in situations similar to that
previously discussed, chemists no longer randomly synthesize
compounds that are structurally similar to compound X to obtain
a new compound with the desired characteristics.25 Thus, as a re-
sult of recent advances in chemical approaches to the solution of
complex compound design problems, there may be a need for a
fundamental change in the statutory scheme for the patentability
of chemical compounds.26
II. BACKGROUND-MECHANICAL PATENTS
Although chemical and mechanical inventions must meet the
same statutory requirements for patentability, the courts use dif-
ferent approaches to the problems surrounding these inventions.27
Such disparate approaches are necessitated by the contrasting na-
ture28 and source of creation of the two types of inventions.29 De-
24. See notes 91-167 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 168-73 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 174-78 infra and accompanying text.
27. See Note, Standards of Obviousness and the Patentabili of Chemical Compounds,
87 HARv. L. REv. 607 (1974), arguing for a fundamental revision in the statutory frame-
work. Id. at 623 n.69.
28. See Note, Patentabili of Chemical Compounds-In re Stemniski, 50 TEx. L. REv.
566, 576 (1972).
Courts have been unable to assess consistently the obviousness of chemical com-
pounds against a standard of patentability devised for mechanical inventions.
The methods and logic that underlie the process of chemical invention often are
wholly different from those underlying nonchemical inventions. The individual
parts of a machine retain their separate identity in the composite whole, but a
chemical compound is the synthesis of chemical elements whose individual iden-
tities are lost entirely in the final result. Although nonchemical elements can be
varied, modified, or altered in an infinite number of ways, chemical compounds
can be constructed and modified only according to the laws of nature.
Id. The structure-property analysis employed in chemical cases for resolving the obvi-
ousness issue would be wholly inappropriate in mechanical cases.
29. One author has observed:
The law of chemical patents is a child (or orphan) of mechanical patent law. But
there are reasons for a distinction between chemical and mechanical patents.
Chemistry is significantly different from applied mechanics. Mechanicians gener-
ally do not create contraptions to see what they will do; chemists do. Machines
are developed to fulfill a specific function, and it is unlikely they will perform
another that is not obvious; the same is not true for chemicals.
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spite these differences, however, it is unrealistic to analyze the
legal issues surrounding the chemical patent without reference to
the Supreme Court decisions in the mechanical field because the
Supreme Court has not yet prescribed nonobviousness criteria for
chemical patents.
The general nonobviousness requirement of patentability is
rooted in the 1850 Supreme Court case of Hotchkiss v. Green-
wood.3° In Hotchkiss, the Court struck down a patent on a door
knob constructed of porcelain or clay because similar devices con-
structed of wood or metal were common. The Court reasoned
that:
[U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of
fastening the shank and the knob were required in the applica-
tion of it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by
an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was
an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which consti-
tute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the
improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of
the inventor.3'
Thus, Hotchkiss stands for two propositions: First, that more than
utility and novelty is required for patentability; and second, that
mere substitution of materials is obvious and does not constitute
"invention." 32 The Hotchkiss rule was codified by the 1952 Patent
Eggert, Uses New Uses and Chemical Patents-A Proposal, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 768, 783
(1969).
A second commentator writes:
A mechanical invention is usually made with a specific utility in mind and the
apparatus or process produced is tailored to fit a certain need .... In contrast, a
chemical compound may be synthesized as a result of research of academic inter-
est only, or it may be made without any specific use in mind and be submitted to
another laboratory for screening to see if it has any utility. On the other hand, a
compound may have its origin from a study of closely related compounds having
beneficial properties and the object in synthesizing the new compound may be in
improving these properties. A compound may have its genesis in the belief that it
will possess properties not possessed by the prior art and thus provide an unex-
pected result or satisfy a long-felt need.
Western, Is 35 U.S. C 103.4pplicable to Chemical Compounds?, 8 IDEA 443, 444 (1964). See
also Hoxie, A Patent Attorney's View, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 630, 636 (1965).
30. 52 U.S. (I1 How.) 248 (1851).
31. Id. at 267. The dissent in Hotchkiss argued that the "true test [of patentability]
was, if the invention was new and better, and cheaper than what preceded it." Id. at 268.
The dissent's argument was partly economic: if the invention is new and useful, it is enti-
tled to patent protection because it increases "the power, convenience and wealth of the
community." Id. at 269.
32. Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words-Is Evolution in Legal Thinking Impossible?,
60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 271, 288 (1978). Judge Rich argues that the Hotchkiss decision
hinged on the word "inventors" in art. I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution. "Inventors" is a
limiting word in the Constitution, and the mere substitution of materials is the work of a
skillful mechanic, not an inventor. Thus, the device was not patentable. Id. at 286.
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Act in the first sentence of section 103:
A patent may not be obtained. . if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvi-
ous at the time the invention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made.33
Section 103 was included in the 1952 Patent Act to promote uni-
formity, definiteness, and stability34 in the judicial resolution of
questions of patentability.
Following the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act and after de-
bate over whether Congress intended to relax the Hotchkiss pat-
entability requirements,35 the Supreme Court decided Graham v.
John Deere36 -a mechanical patent case involving a device that
absorbed the shock of plow shanks when used in rocky soil. The
Court, after a detailed discussion of the policy and precedents un-
derlying section 103,3  concluded that section 103 was not in-
tended to change the existing patentability requirements and
announced a three-step analysis of the obviousness issue:
Under Section 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to
be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims
at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in
the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obvi-
ousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined.3s
The Court then stated that "secondary considerations ' 39 such as
"commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of
33. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
34. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952). The statute was not intended to be
the final word on the criteria, but was intended to "serve as a basis for the addition at a
later time of some criteria which may be worked ouL" Id. at 18. See also Rich, supra note
32, at 290.
35. See Note, The Standard of Patentabiliy--Judicial Interpretation ofSection 103 and
the Patent Act, 63 COLuM. L. REV. 306 (1963); Note, Patent Law-Test of Invention, 1956
Wis. L. REv. 513.
36. 383 U.S. 1 (1965).
37. Id. at 3-17. For other historical discussions of § 103, see Rich, supra note 32, at
281-93; Note, supra note 27, at 607 n.2. See also Colaianni, 35 U.S.C. § 103: A Questfor
Objectivity, 39 FED. BJ. 23 (1980).
38. 383 U.S. at 17.
39. There has been considerable dispute over the word "secondary." Some authorities
argue that the factors are secondary in time only and always should be considered, while
other authorities argue that secondary refers to factors secondary in importance and need
not be considered in every case. Schneider, Non-Obviousness, the Supreme Court and the
Prospectsfor Stability, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 304, 312-13 (1978).
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others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.
As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may
have relevancy."'4 The Court also attempted to settle the issue of
whether obviousness was a factual or legal issue4' by declaring
that it was essentially an issue of law which lent itself to factual
42inquiries.
Despite Graham and section 103, courts continue to have diffi-
culty with the nonobviousness analysis.43 Most authorities agree,
however, that in mechanical combination patents an invention
must show synergism44---the effect of the whole is greater than the
sum of the effects of the parts-to establish nonobviousness.45 In
contrast, a synergistic effect need not be proven to establish the
nonobviousness of a chemical compound,' as the proof would be
trivial.47 In this context, therefore, synergism as a requirement of
patentability requires no further discussion.
Thus, mechanical patent cases such as Graham provide useful
background for discussions concerning the patentability require-
40. 383 U.S. at 17-18.
41. Id. at 17.
42. The issue of whether obviousness is an issue of fact or law remains unsettled. See
Goldstein, Conflicting Rules of Patent Law Within the Federal Judiciary System, 12 INTEL-
LECTUAL PROP. L. REV, 135 (1980); Note, Non-Obviousness in Patent Law: A Question of
Law or Fact, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 612 (1977).
43. See notes 65-76 infra and accompanying text.
44. For recent discussions of this topic, compare Goldstein, supra note 42, at 139-41
with Rich, supra note 32, at 295 and Crossan, Patent Law: Sywergism Rejected, 56 Cm.-
KENT L. REv. 339 (1980). See also Synergism Virus: Cause and Cure, a talk by Chief
Judge Markey before the Los Angeles Patent Law Association (Sept. 16, 1980), reprinted in
496 BNA PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. D-I (1980). Judge Markey of the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals argues strongly against synergism, asserting that mechanical
inventions cannot exhibit synergism because such an exhibition would contradict the laws
of physics. Id.
45. Synergism was conceived in A&P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147
(1950), and emerged in Anderson's Black Rock v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1961).
Crossan, supra note 44, at 241-42.
46. The electro-chemical invention in United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966),
decided the same day as Graham, shows synergism. Each individual element of theAdams
invention (a battery) could be found in the prior art. The daas invention, however, was
synergistic in its unexpected operating advantages over the prior art. Id. at 51. TheAdams
battery was held nonobvious over the prior art because of the prevalence of secondary
Graham considerations, including initial disbelief of experts, unexpected beneficial operat-
ing characteristics, indications in the prior art away from the invention, immediate recogni-
tion in the field, and only one reference to cite against the invention. Id. at 51-52.
47. The effective properties of a simple molecule like ethylene glycol, for example, are
not the mere sum of the properties of two carbon atoms, six hydrogen atoms, and two
oxygen atoms. Ethylene glycol can act as an efficient heat exchange fluid in automobile
radiators where the individual components, taken collectively, cannot.
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ments for chemical compounds. As a result of factual distinctions
between chemical and mechanical patents, however, the legal doc-
trines in the two areas are not interchangeable.
III. POLICY AND SECTION 103
Article I of the Constitution contains the authority for Con-
gress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. . .. -48 The
Graham court viewed the phrase, "promote the Progress," as a
limitation on the power given to Congress to legislate in the patent
field:
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose ef-
fects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain,
or to restrict free access of materials already available. Innova-
tion, advancement and things which add to the sum of iseful
knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must "promote the Progress of...
useful Arts."1
4 9
The Graham discussion defined progress as the sum of useful
knowledge in the useful arts and viewed the historical mechanism
by which progress is promoted as economic, stating: "This patent
monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural
right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an inducement,
to bring forth new knowledge."50
Thus, the limited monopoly afforded by a patent provides an
incentive to invent, disclose the invention, and invest in the re-
search, development, production, and marketing of the inven-
tion.51  Intertwined with these incentives is the other major
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, eL 8 "mhe Founding Fathers were not writing a standard
of patentability into the Constitution; they left that job to Congress under certain re-
straints." Rich, supra note 32, at 284 (emphasis supplied).
49. 383 U.S. at 6. Cf. Rich, Princioles oftPatentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393
(1960).
The patent system does not promote progress merely by rewarding those who
succeed commercially. It promotes it by stimulating inventive activity, by bring-
ing out a disclosure of the results of that activity, and by encouraging investment
in the production and marketing of inventions as well as in research and develop-
ment. It is not to be expected that everything which this stimulus succeeds in
producing will be of equally good quality.
Id. at 400-01.
50. 383 U.S. at 9. For discussions of this topic, see Rich, supra note 32, at 281-87 and
articles cited therein. Progress also may be measured in economic terms; see Harris & Fay,
Certain incontestable Patents are Warranted, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 27, 30 (1978).
51. For discussions of the incentive features of the patent system, see Crews, T7he Three
Patent Incentives-A Reappraisal, 43 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 554 (1961); Rich, supra note 49.
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function of the patent system: to protect the patentee's intellectual
property rights by excluding others from making, using, or selling
the invention for the statutory period of seventeen years. 2 Both
the incentive and protective features of the patent system favor the
grant of a patent to promote progress in the useful arts.
Alternatively, when the patent grant is viewed as a limited mo-
nopoly whereby the inventor may exact a toll from the public for
use of the invention, the goal of protecting the economic interests
of the public favors the denial of patent protection for inven-
tions.53 This view of the patent grant echoes the philosophy of
Thomas Jefferson, the author of the original Patent Act of 1793,
who reflected the public's aversion to monopolies when he stated:
"Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from
them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may
produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to the
will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint
The incentive features of the patent system are most frequently analyzed in economic
terms: the incentive to invent is a long term pecuniary incentive that fosters competition in
the marketplace. After the grant of a patent, the patentee is prodded by the fear of loss of
his or her position in the marketplace while the competition is driven by the hope of im-
proving its position in the marketplace. Geoffrey, Do the 4tomic Energy Act and National
Aeronautics and Space Act Promote Adequate Space Advancements?, 43 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
624, 632-33 (1961).
One commentator notes:
Although some observers maintain that inventors are motivated by a certain intel-
lectual fanaticism and are oblivious to worldly gain, in fact, no inventor would
spend his time and energy and no company or backer would incur the necessary
costs to engage in such a risky venture without a special incentive.
Dratler, Incentivesfor People: The Forgotten Purpose f the Patent System, 16 HARy. J.
LEGIS. 129, 137-38 (1979).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). The intertwining of these two features of the patent sys-
tem is illustrated by the following statements: "Inventors, denied protection, will not have
the incentive and thus progress shall falter." Geoffrey, supra note 51, at 632. Alternatively,
the incentive to invent Lr the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling one's
invention for the statutory period. Crews, supra note 51, at 554.
53. See Schneider, supra note 39, at 323-27. Professor Schneider presents a strong
argument for the reappraisal of the economic underpinnings in courts' decisions:
The Supreme Court-and everyone-carries a bundle of economic predilections,
and all of them can't be made explicit and placed in logical array in the develop-
ment of an opinion. Economic considerations are part of the real world economic
background, which we take for granted, in which patents operate pursuant to the
constitutional purpose. But economics is a complex subject and, as in patent law,
easy assumptions may do violence to the whole truth. Are the Court's usually
unspoken economic premises correct or appropriate to the occasion in any given
decision? If patents do indeed represent the heavy hand of tribute or tolls exacted
from users of a public way, the reasons for the court's exacting and often patent-
defeating requirements for patent validity can be understood. And if that is the
message the lower courts are hearing, the kind of stability reflected by the premise
that the only good patent is a dead patent is not far off.
Id. at 325-26.
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from anybody." 4 Furthermore, when a second investor seeks to
patent a device similar to one already patented, the need to protect
the first invention weighs against granting a patent to the second
inventor. The patent grant, therefore, is viewed best as a limited
monopoly affording incentives such as limited protection for pro-
spective patentees.
When the focus of the inquiry is narrowed to chemical patents
with a potential pharmaceutical application, additional policy
considerations become relevant.55 The denial of patent protection
for a newly synthesized chemical compound, for example, may
deprive the public of the use of potentially improved drugs.56
This problem arises both because the examination of a chemical's
pharmacological properties is usually incomplete when the patent
application is filed and because the patent office generally does
not know whether thae chemical is a suitable pharmaceutical for
human use. Thus, protection for the pharmaceutical companies'
chemical discoveries is essential initially to ensure that substantial
investments are continued in the research, development, and test-
ing of new compounds. 58
These considerations favor patentability in the chemical and
pharmaceutical fields. In fact, a problem of over-patenting may
54. VI WRrIINOS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 181 (H. Washington ed. 1854), quoted in
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). "Although recognizing the patent sys-
tem's desirable stimulus to invention, we have also viewed the patent as a monopoly which,
although sanctioned by law, has the economic consequences attending other monopolies."
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 343
(1970).
55. Effective policies of a patent system also would nurture inventive minds through
industry research funds, Sparks, Initiation, Care andFeeding of New Ideas, 47 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 613, 618 (1965), and would protect the research atmosphere in the industry.
DeStevens, A Chemist's View, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 653, 657 (1965).
56. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 630 F.2d 120 (3d
Cir. 1980):
Unless this type of an investment of human and capital resources is rewarded by
some form of patent protection, companies such as Eli Lilly might well choose not
to undertake such large expenditures and instead devote themselves to other en-
deavors. To the extent this change occurs, resources would be diverted from ac-
tivity that is socially beneficial--the development of new drugs.
Id. at 137.
57. Marcus, The Patent Office and Pharmaceutical Invention, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
669, 673 (1965).
58. Denton, A Researcher's View, 47 J. PAT. OFF Soc'y 658, 661 (1965). The protec-
tion is the assurance the pharmaceutical company seeks for its continually increasing in-
vestment in the compounds it develops. There is limited opportunity for the corporation to
recoup its investment without a patent. Id. The patent problem is only one of the barriers
to overcome in recouping investments made in the marketing of new chemical compounds
in the drug field. See also REGULATING NEw DRUGS, supra note 23.
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exist in these fields which is not inherent in the mechanical field.59
Where the second applicant has made a chemical compound
structurally similar to a previously patented compound and the
chemical compounds possess essentially the same properties,
granting a patent to the second applicant would undercut the pre-
vious patentee's original incentive to patent and deprive the first
patentee of expected protection. The subject matter of the second
application might meet with commercial success through an at-
tractive advertising campaign or a less expensive production and
distribution scheme, which are not necessarily characteristics of
the subject matter itself. From a policy perspective, therefore, it
would be improper to grant a patent for a chemical compound
that is structurally similar to a compound previously patented
when the two compounds have substantially similar properties.
Some decisions in the area of chemical patentability reflect the
above-mentioned policy considerations. Other decisions can be
rationalized if credence is given to such considerations. The pol-
icy discussions of the courts, however, are often too brief to be
useful.60 When strong policy bases do exist for a decision in this
area, the policy is either not discussed or inadequately treated.
Thus, the reliance by courts on policy justifications which they fail
to discuss may explain why cases involving rejections predicated
on obviousness seem to be irreconcilable.
IV. RATIONALE OF SECTION 103 OBVIOUSNESS REJECTIONS
The Supreme Court in Graham explained the underlying the-
ory behind section 103: Congress only may enact legislation that
authorizes patents for inventions which promote progress in the
useful arts.61 Furthermore, only new and useful inventions which
59. The situation herein discussed is different from Judge Rich's argument that there
is no risk of overpatenting because the marketplace can differentiate between the subject
matters of the patents. Thus, the patent granted on a "commercial dud" is a nullity be-
cause an unwanted item is the subject of the monopoly. Rich, supra note 49, at 400-02.
The problem with Judge Rich's argument is its assumption that there is a free flow of
information to consumers who can discern the respective qualities of various related inven-
tions. In the case of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, however, these assumptions may be
invalid. Consumers may not be able to discriminate between two structurally similar
pharmaceuticals that possess substantially similar pharmacological properties.
60. But see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 630 F.2d 120
(3d Cir. 1980). The policy considerations in the Eli Lilly case concerned a preliminary
injunction. These considerations apply with equal weight, however, to the nonobviousness
issue.
61. 383 U.S. at 5.
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advance understanding and knowledge promote such progress.62
Hence, discoveries which do not expand this body of knowledge
fail to promote progress in the useful arts and are deemed "obvi-
ous" and therefore unpatentable.63
A. Motivation Rationale
The motivation rationale is the strongest legal rationale for the
rejection of a claim based on obviousness. If the prior art contains
enough information to suggest to the person of ordinary skill in
the art that a certain modification of a known compound would
possess advantageous properties, the modified compound which
conforms to the suggestion would be obvious.6' If there is no sug-
gestion in the prior art that the modified compound would possess
beneficial properties, the compound should not be deemed
obvious.
Hypothetically, the prior art may disclose a compound useful
as an anaesthetic and also indicate that substituent Y prolongs the
activity of anaesthetics. A chemist then may modify compound X
so that it contains substituent Y (X-Y) with the expectation that
the anaesthetic will possess prolonged activity. X-Y may possess
prolonged activity as an anaesthetic but, ultimately, it is unpatent-
able because that characteristic is obvious. Most cases, however,
do not possess suggestions in the prior art that are as strong as
those suggested by the hypothetical, and some courts seem to
adopt less appropriate rationales.
B. Quantum of Novelty Rationale
The quantum of novelty theory, an example of a less appropri-
ate rationale, suggests that the idea represented in the invention,
although new, does not possess the requisite quantum of novelty
to permit a limited monopoly. Justice Bradley discussed this ra-
tionale in Atlantic Works v. Brady:65
The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make
some substantial discovery or invention, which adds to our
knowledge and makes a step in advance in the useful arts.
Such inventors are worthy of all favor. It was never the object
62. Id. at 9.
63. Id.
64. In re Stemniski, 444 F.2d 581, 586 (C.C.P.A. 1971). See also Wyman, Chemical
Compounds and35 U.S.C. 103, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 586, 587-89 (1968); Note, supra note-
27, at 625; Note, supra note 28, at 572 n.30.
65. 107 U.S. 192 (1882).
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of those laws to grant a monopoly for every tr%ing device, every
shadow of a shade 0/an idea, which would naturally and spon-
taneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordi-
nary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate
creation of exclusive 6privileges tends rather to obstruct than to
stimulate invention.'
Justice Bradley's "shadow of a shade of an idea," however, is a
standard which focuses on novelty rather than obviousness.
Equally inappropriate is the argument that the quantum of nov-
elty in an invention may be so great that the invention's nonobvi-
ousness is indisputable.67 These often unarticulated analyses
evidence a confusion between the applicability of sections 102 and
103 of the Patent Act. This confusion is reinforced by the lan-
guage of both Graham and section 103 which emphasize "differ-
ences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art."6 8
Section 103 analyses also suffer from hindsight analysis6 9 in
which the court reads the teachings of the invention at issue into
the prior art. Such deficient analysis invariably results in an obvi-
ousness rejection.70 This problem can be resolved if the courts
remember to examine the differences "when it [the invention] was
made,"'" as patent attorneys do in completing the application.72
Another problem encountered in section 103 analyses is decid-
ing from whose viewpoint obviousness should be measured. The
plain meaning of section 103 suggests that such obviousness
should be measured from the perspective of the person of ordi-
nary skill in the art.73 From this perspective, it would be most
logical to examine not only a few select prior art references, but all
related publications of which the person of ordinary skill in the art
was aware when the invention was made. This view of the prior
art would enhance the court's appreciation of the level of skill in
66. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
67. Laurence, Patentability ofHomologs, Isomers and Other 4nalogs, in PATENTS FOR
CHEMICAL INVENTIONS 73, 78 (American Chemical Society Advances In Chemistry Series
No. 46, 1964).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976), interpreted in 383 U.S. at 17-19.
69. 383 U.S. at 36.
70. Id See 347 BNA PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. A-12 (1977) (summary of Tom
Arnold's speech before the BNA's conference on "Non-obviousness: The Standard of Pat-
entability," (Sept. 7-9, 1977)). Arnold argues that this hindsight analysis also arises from
the "differences" language of both Graham and § 103 which focuses on the differences
which were not apparent when the invention was made. Id.
71. Markey, supra note 44, at D-1.
72. See text accompanying notes 174-78 infra.
73. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
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the art and might lessen the tendency of courts to deem inventions
obvious.74 The courts, however, do not adopt this viewpoint in
their examination of the prior art.15 After reviewing only a lim-
ited number of prior art references, courts seemingly substitute
their own judgments for those of the person of ordinary skill in
the art and, as a result, have difficulty both in finding the claimed
invention not obvious and in articulating reasons for their de-
cisions.
Since the enactment of the 1952 Act, therefore, problems have
plagued the courts' attempts to define workable standards and to
articulate the rationales underlying section 103 of the 1952 Act.
The history of the section has taught the legal community that no
single approach is satisfactory. In fact, the courts are split; some
courts support a rule that preserves the policies of the patent sys-
tem and other courts support a rule that would satisfy prospective
patentees. This tension has resulted in statutory requirements
which yield to the policies behind the patent system.76 A partial
solution to this problem may be found if courts would limit obvi-
ousness rejections to cases where it can be shown that the inventor
clearly was motivated by prior art references and the claimed in-
vention was obvious in light of all the prior art references at the
time the invention was made.
V. SECTION 103 AND CHEMICAL PATENTS
A. The Hass-Henze Doctrine
Prior to the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 103, the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals decided the two cases which form the
basis of the Hass-Henze doctrine.77 The first case, In re Hass,78
involved an applicant seeking a patent for certain nitrated alkenes
when the prior art contained a homologue79 and an isomer 0 of
74. In re Murch, 464 F.2d 1051, 1055 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (citing In re Palmer, 451 F.2d
1100, 1102-03 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
75. See, e.g., In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963). "The problem of 'obvi-
ousness'... is not really a problem in chemistry .... It is a problem ofpatent law." Id.
at 386 (emphasis supplied). This statement reinforces the argument made by some com-
mentators that the person "of ordinary skill in the art" is as mythical as the "reasonable
person" in tort law. See Colaianni, supra note 37, at 28; Western, supra note 29, at 446.
76. See notes 163-78 infra and accompanying text.
77. In re Henze, 181 F.2d 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950); In re Hass & Susie, 141 F.2d 122
(C.C.P.A. 1944).
78. 141 F.2d 122 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
79. See note 6 supra See also Note, supra note 28, at 568 n.12.
80. See note 6 supra.
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one of the claimed compounds. In rejecting Hass' claims, the
court stated:
It is well understood by chemists that the members of a homol-
ogous series of chemical compounds possess the same principal
characteristics; that generally the chemical and physical proper-
ties of the individual members vary gradually from member to
member, and that knowledge of the properties and chemical
behavior of one of the members suggests to the chemist the
properties and chemical behavior of the other members of the
series. 8'
Hass thus stands for the proposition that when considering the
obviousness of chemical compounds, where the isomers or homo-
logues of such compounds are found in the prior art, the com-
pound claims will be invalid unless the applicant can prove some
unexpected or unobvious beneficial properties not possessed by
the prior art compounds. The rationale in Hass indicates the
court's view that the chemist had invented nothing by synthesizing
a structurally similar compound to the compound disclosed in the
prior art. The court rejected Hass' claims because the applicant
failed to prove any significant difference between the properties of
the claimed compound and those properties possessed by the prior
art compound. This conclusion is consistent with the Hotchkiss
edict that invention requires more than mere novelty.8 2
The second case supporting the Hass-Henze doctrine, In re
Henze, 3 elevated the Hass requirement to apresumption of un-
patentability, rebuttable only by proof that the prior art com-
pound did not, infact, possess the properties of the structurally
similar claimed compound-in this case, the next lower homo-
logue of the prior art compound.84 This expansion of the Hass-
Henze doctrine engendered much criticism from the legal com-
munity. Critics claimed that the presumption of unpatentability
placed a burden on the inventor to test comparatively the claimed
compound with structurally similar prior art compounds. Such a
burden was viewed as a disincentive to disclose the invention in
contravention of the major policies of the patent system.8 5
81. 141 F.2d at 125. The court rejected Hass' claims despite the appellant's argument
that the prior art failed to disclose a workable synthesis for the claimed compound and that
the prior art reference was published prior to proper identification of the claimed
compound.
82. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
83. 181 F.2d 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
84. Id at 201.
85. See Note, supra note 27, at 610 n.14; Note, supra note 28, at 570 and references
cited therein.
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B. The Demise of the Hass-Henze Doctrine-The Growth of
Inse.parabdity
In reaction to the criticism of the Hass-Henze doctrine, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, in a series of opinions,
gradually weakened the doctrine and replaced it with the insepa-
rability doctrine. The first opinion to indicate a movement away
from the Hass-Henze doctrine, In re Mills, 6 involved an applicant
seeking to overturn a board rejection of claims on an anticaking
agent where the prior art disclosed an anticaking agent that was
neither an isomer nor a homologue of the claimed compound.
The Mills court held that Hass-Henze was inapplicable in this sit-
uation and that the Henze presumption was merely an inference
of fact which placed the burden of persuasion on the applicant.
8 8
Most importantly, the court in Mills recognized that dfferences as
well as similarities in properties are obviously expected when
studying members of homologous series.8 9 In reversing the
board's rejection of the applicant's claims, the Mills court stated
that homology is but one factor which should be considered in
determining questions of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.90
Prior to In re Papesch,91 the next major case in this area, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals always used the Hass-
Henze doctrine to deny patentability unless the applicant could
prove the existence of unexpected properties which the structur-
ally similar prior art compound did not possess.92 In the ap esch
decision, however, the court used an affirmative restatement of the
Hass-Henze doctrine to grant a patent for a triethyl compound
possessing an advantageous antiinflammatory characteristic which
the prior art trimethyl compound did not possess. The court
stated, "[P]roof of the existence of unobvious or unexpected bene-
ficial properties in a new compound, which would otherwise ap-
pear to be obvious (along with its properties), is indicative of the
86. 281 F.2d 218 (C.C.P.A. 1960), noted in 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957 (1961).
87. The prior art compounds contained at least seven and as many as eleven addi-
tional methylene groups (-CH2 -) over the claimed compound. See also note 6 supra.
88. The Mills court distinguished Henze on the peculiar fact that the Henze applicant
reasonably could have been expected to have the results of the comparative testing of the
prior art and claimed compounds on hand.
89. 281 F.2d at 224.
90. Id
91. 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
92. See generally In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 387-92 (C.C.P.A. 1963), and cases dis-
cussed therein.
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presence of 'invention' and hence of patentability." 93
The Papesch decision, therefore, reiterated the position of the
Mills court that proven dissimilarities in homologue compounds
are more important than assumed similarities. Moreover, the
Papesch court reasoned that since the prior art did not disclose a
beneficial property for the trimethyl compound, it was not obvious
for a chemist to synthesize the triethyl compound to obtain its
beneficial property. This analysis is consistent with the motiva-
tion rationale.94 In addition, the Papesch decision examined both
the structures and the properties of the claimed and prior art com-
pounds to resolve questions of obviousness and stated that a
"compound and all of its properties are inseparable." 95 Thus,
Papesch is the foundation of the inseparability doctrine. Papesch
indicates, however, that the claimed compound is not patentable
where the prior art discloses a structurally similar compound
which possesses the same properties as the claimed compound to a
lesser degree.96 ",4 mere dference in degree is not the marked
superiority which ordinarily will remove the unpatentability of
adjacent homologues of old substances." 97
This "lesser degree" problem arose only three months after
Papesch in In re ]iden.98 The court in Riden, following the rea-
soning of Papesch, denied the grant of a patent where the appli-
cant failed to prove that the claimed compound possessed a new
property not possessed by the prior art compound.99 The Hass-
Henze requirements, therefore, survived where the prior art dis-
closed a beneficial property similar to that possessed by the struc-
turally related claimed compound. The applicant in Riden further
argued that the synthetic route"° to the claimed compound was
undisclosed in the prior art and thus made the compound nonob-
vious.101 The court recognized that although the synthetic route is
a relevant factor to consider in resolving questions of obviousness,
93. 315 F.2d at 386.
94. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
95. 315 F.2d at 391. Support for this conclusion is found in § 103: "Subject matter as
a whole" includes the claimed compound's structure and properties. See also Commis-
sioner of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-und-Silber-Scheideanstalt Vormals Roessler, 397 F.2d
656, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
96. 315 F.2d at 392 (citing In re Loring Coes, 173 F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1949)).
97. Id. (emphasis supplied).
98. 318 F.2d 761 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
99. Id at 764.
100. A synthetic route is a series of individual synthetic steps utilized in the production
of a chemical compound.
101. 318 F.2d at 764.
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it is entitled to minimal weight. 10 2
One year after Riden, the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals decided In re Eliern, °3 a split decision that illustrates the
disagreement within the court in the mid-1960's over questions of
chemical obviousness. In Elpern, the examiner viewed the prior
art compound as homologous to the claimed compound when, in
fact, the compounds contained different alkyl substituents at two
adjacent carbon atoms. The court compared the structural differ-
ences of the compounds and concluded that these compounds
were nonadjacent members of a homologous series that fell within
the Mills exception to Hass-Henze. 'I This conclusion allowed
the court to confer patentability without considering the differ-
ences in properties between the claimed compounds and the prior
art compounds.05 Thus, the court's analysis, which examined
structural similarities rather than property similarities, weakened
the Hass-Henze doctrine without augmenting the inseparability
doctrine. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Smith argued
that Papesch required the court to consider the structural similari-
ties as well as the pharmacological properties in the claimed and
prior art compounds to resolve questions of obviousness. 0 6 Judge
Smith found that the prior art disclosed no pharmacological
properties on which to base an obviousness rejection and con-
cluded that the claimed compounds were patentable. 0 7
The dissenters in Elpern, Judges Almond and Worley, argued
that the structural similarity of the prior art and claimed com-
pounds required a direct comparison of the compounds' physical
properties to resolve the obviousness issue'°8--a position more
consistent with the Hass-Henze doctrine. Thus, the Elpern deci-
sion illustrates the variety of approaches to questions of chemical
obviousness taken by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in
the mid-1960's.
In 1971, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals resolved
some of the conflicts in this area with its decision in In re
Stemniski.0 9 In Stemniski, two prior art references could be com-
102. Id
103. 326 F.2d 762 (C.C.P.A. 1964). Judge Martin, writing for the court, was joined by
Judge Rich.
104. Id at 767.
105. Id
106. Id at 767-68.
107. Id
108. Id at 768-69.
109. 444 F.2d 581 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
19811
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bined to teach the synthesis of the claimed component but neither
reference disclosed any utility for the prior art compounds. The
appellant, arguing for a reversal of the board's rejection of his pat-
ent request, asserted that "[D]iscovery of the utility itself is evi-
dence of the unobviousness [sic] of the novel compounds."1 0 The
court accepted the appellant's argument and reversed the rejection
of his claims:
[W]hat on this record-other than abstract, theoretical or aca-
demic considerations-would lead one of ordinary skill to
change the structure of the reference compounds to obtain the
claimed compounds? Certainly no practical considerations
which promote the progress of useful arts or are of use to soci-
ety are manifest. How can there be obviousness of structure, or
particularly of the subject matter as a whole, when no apparent
purpose or result is to be achieved, no reason or motivation to
be satisfied, upon modifying the reference compounds'
structure?...
The court, by explicitly overruling Henze and Riden, struck
down the comparative testing requirement where the properties of
the structurally similar prior art compounds are not disclosed in
the prior art."I2 The decision in Stemniski, which grants a patent
on the composition of matter where the true discovery lies in un-
expected beneficial properties, has met with mixed reaction in the
legal community." 3 The decision has been criticized on the
grounds that the full composition of matter patent is a "windfall"
protection where the patentee's true invention exists in the com-
pound's properties." 4 Critics assert that the use patent is more
appropriate than the composition of matter patent in such circum-
stances.I 5 In light of this criticism, Stemniski and other deci-
sions 1 6 indicate that the policies of the patent system are served
110. Id at 584.
111. Id at 586.
112. Id at 587.
113. Compare Kitch, The Patent System and the New Drug Applicatiorn An Evaluation
ofthe Incentives/or Private Investment in New Drug Research and Marketing, in REGULAT-
ING NEw DRUGS, supra note 23, at 81, 88-100 with Note, supra note 27, at 614-20.
114. Kitch, supra note 113.
115. Id at 88; Note supra note 27, at 608 n.5.
116. The most significant District Court case after Papesch but prior to Stemniski was
Commissioner of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-und-Silber Scheideanstalt Vormals Roessler,
397 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger realized that the enor-
mous number of known organic compounds gives rise to a situation where the synthesis of
a new chemical compound with a unique grouping of atoms is a rare occurrence. Id at
663. Thus, in a situation where an obviousness rejection is predicated only on structural
similarity, few new compounds would be patentable, and the incentive aspects of the patent
system would be lost. Id
[Vol. 31:949
CHEMICAL OBVIOUSNESS
best by granting a patent on the composition of matter rather than
on the use. Thus, the inseparability doctrine, although not with-
out limitations, 117 continues to expand."
8
The Third Circuit recently adopted the Papesch approach in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 630 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980), apparently overruling a
prior district court opinion, Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa.
1970) (dicta), aff'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 592 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934
(1972). See also Note, supra note 27, at 614-16.
In contrast, the Second Circuit has failed twice to accept the Papesch doctrine by dis-
posing of cases on alternative grounds. See General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Jefferson Chem-
ical Co., 497 F.2d 1238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 968 (1974); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v.
Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd on other
grounds sub norm. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 929 (1973).
117. See, e.g., In re Grose, 592 F.2d 1161 (C.C.P.A. 1979).. The Grose court reviewed
the board's rejection of claims for a patent on a zeolite, a chemical mixture essentially
identical in composition to a prior art zeolite, and specifically restricted the application of
the Papesch decision to its facts:
No reason exists for applying the law relating to structural obviousness of those
compounds which are homologs or isomers of each other to this case.... A
zeolite, like those of the instant case, is not a compound which is a homolog or
isomer of another, but is a mixture of various compounds ....
Id at 1167-68.
The court affirmed the board's rejection on the grounds that the appellants X-ray data
failed to prove that the claimed zeolite was structurally different from the prior art zeolite.
Had the Grose court employed the inseparability doctrine, a twa-pronged inquiry would
have resulted. First, the court would ask whether the similarities in chemical composition
of the claimed and prior art zeolites would indicate a similarity in the properties of the
zeolites. This question would probably be answered in the affirmative. Second, the court
would ask whether proof of the differences in the properties of the zeolites would rebut a
showing of obviousness based on chemical composition similarity. The answer to this
question would demand an inquiry into whether the X-ray properties of a zeolite are useful
properties-an inquiry which the court was not willing to undertake.
The avoidance in Grose of the inseparability doctrine contradicts the analysis of
Papesch engaged in by the court in In re Huellmantel, 324 F.2d 998 (C.C.P.A. 1963). In
that chemical mixture case, the court examined the similarity of the claimed and prior art
chemical compositions and their pharmaceutical properties. Id. at 1001.
118. The inseparability doctrine recently has been incorporated in the area of optical
isomers where the prior art discloses the chemical racemate. Optical isomers are com-
pounds which differ only in their effect upon polarized light and their reactivities in an
asymmetric environment. A racemate is a fifty-fifty mixture of laevo-rotatory and dextro-
rotatory optical isomers. These two components of a racemic mixture may be separated
and purified. The issue in these cases is whether the pure optical isomer is patentable when
the prior art discloses the racemate.
The leading case on optical isomers is In re Williams, 171 F.2d 319 (C.C.P.A. 1948). In
Williams, the applicant sought a patent for the laevo rotamer of a lactone where the race-
mic lactone was disclosed in the prior art. The court reversed the board's rejection of the
applicant's claim on the ground that there was no proof that one skilled in the art would
know that the prior art disclosed a racemic mixture. The court indicated that had the prior
art reference clearly disclosed that the lactone obtained was a racemic mixture, the knowl-
edge possessed by those skilled in the art (that racemic mixtures may be separated into the
dextro and laevo optical isomers) would make the laevo isomer obvious and unpatentable.
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C. Prima Fade Obviousness
A prima facie"19 showing of obviousness is made when the
prior art reveals chemical compounds so similar in structure to the
claimed compound that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
expect the properties of the prior art and the claimed compound to
be similar.'" The more similar the structures of the prior art and
claimed compounds, the stronger the inference that a prima facie
case of obviousness has been made.' This prima facie case, once
In re Adamson, 275 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1960), followed Williams and denied the pat-
entability of a claimed optical isomer under similar facts. The Adamson court, however,
recognized two important facts: First, that a person of ordinary skill in the art should have
known that the compound disclosed in the prior art was racemic; and, second, that the
physiological activities of the different optical isomers are expected to be different. These
facts led the court in Adamson to conclude that it would be obvious for one skilled in the
art to separate a racemic mixture into its dextro and laevo isomers and test the individual
isomers for their physiological activity.
The Adamson decision is properly viewed as superseding the Witlliams' obviousness
analysis. Exparte Openshaw, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1964). Later
cases which favorably cite Williams focus on the novelty requirement. See, eg., In re May,
574 F.2d 1082 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Williams is one case in a long line of cases beginning with
the now famous Aspirin Case, Farbernfabriken of Elberfeld Co. v. Kuehmsted, 171 F. 887
(N.D. I11. 1909), ap'd, 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910). Most recent cases, such as May, have
abandoned the Adamson analysis and adopted the inseparability analysis. In May, the
court reversed the board's rejection because the applicant proved that the claimed optical
isomers of prior art compounds were nonaddictive, a property not disclosed in the prior art.
Research established substantial unpredictability in the physiological activities of these and
other closely related compounds. Read in light of Williams and.4damson, May establishes
some uniformity in the area of chemical patents. May rejects the factual distinctions of the
Papesch decision and broadens the inseparability doctrine to include the area of optical
isomers. This broad reading of Papesch may have future impact on other areas of chemical
patents not covered by the inseparability doctrine. See also In re Kratz, 592 F.2d 1169
(C.C.P.A. 1979).
119. The words "inference of obviousness" in the Elpern decision were replaced by
"prima facie obviousness" in In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1970). There is, how-
ever, a line of cases stating that the term used is not necessarily controlling. "Whether it is
called an inference of obviousness ... [or] a prima facie showing of obviousness... is,
we believe, immaterial." Commissioner of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-und-Silber Scheide-
anstalt Vormals Roessler, 397 F.2d 656, 664 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
120. In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
121. The expectation of similarity in the properties of prior art and claimed com-
pounds, however, does not extend to cases where the prior art compound is a product of a
series of chemical reactions and the claimed compound is an intermediate in the reaction
sequence.
In re Gyurik, 596 F.2d 1012 (C.C.P.A. 1979), involved a claim for a thio compound
where the prior art disclosed a sulfinyl compound allowing the claimed compound to be
used as an intermediate in the synthesis of the prior art compound. Although the prior art
compound possessed a general beneficial property (anthelminticity), the claimed com-
pound proved to possess greater anthelmintic activity and lower toxicity. The court held
there was no presumption of unpatentability (obviousness) in a case where the intermediate
in a reaction sequence is the claimed compound and the end product is the prior art com-
pound. The rationale for this rule is twofold: First, there is no presumed similarity of
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made, is rebuttable only by proof that its underlying presumptions
are invalid. 122 Such a showing can be achieved if the applicant
can prove that there are actual and signficant differences between
the properties of the claimed and prior art compounds 123 or that
the differences which exist were unexpected in light of the prior
art.1 24 Furthermore, the prima facie case of obviousness will be
deemed rebutted if it can be established that the chemist was un-
motivated by the prior art125 or that the claimed compound's
structure was not obvious from the prior art.126 Finally, a success-
ful rebuttal can be predicated on a showing that a substantial de-
gree of unpredictability exists in the prior art.127
The answer to the recurring question-whether the prior art
disclosures of chemical structures and properties constitute suffi-
cient motivation for the synthesis of the claimed com-
pound 12--provides the most appropriate rationale for these
decisions.' 29 This subjective question concerning the chemist's
motivation is answerable only upon the examination of two objec-
tive factors: the similarity of the prior art and claimed struc-
tures, 130 and the relationship between the properties of the prior
art compound and the properties of the claimed compound.' 3'
By a direct comparison of the structures of the prior art and
claimed compounds, an argument against a prima facie showing
of obviousness can be made based on the dissimilarity of those
properties between intermediates and their corresponding end products; and second, there
is no motivation for the chemist to test intermediates for the activity possessed by their end
products. Based on these reasons, the court reversed the board's obviousness rejection. See
also In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Magerlein, 602 F.2d 366 (C.C.P.A.
1979).
122. In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
123. In re Shetty, 566 F.2d 81 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
124. Application of Juillard, 476 F.2d 1380 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
125. Thus, the prior art is silent as to the properties of the structurally similar prior art
compounds. In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1385 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Stenniski, 444 F.2d 581
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
126. In re Grunwell, 609 F.2d 486 (C.C.P.A. 1979). See Wegner, Prima Facie Obvi-
ousness of Chemical Compounds, 6 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 271 (1978).
127. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 630 F.2d 120 (3d
Cir. 1980). See also PL CHOATE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 371 (1973);
Note, supra note 27.
128. In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
129. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
130. See Wegner, supra note 126.
131. These two objective factors highlight the ascertainable differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue and, as such, are primary considerations in the Graham
sense. 383 U.S. at 17.
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structures. 132 It might be just as instructive, however, to compare
synthetic methods when arguing against the establishment of a
prima facie case. Proof that the chemist employed a synthetic
route different from that disclosed in the prior art-provided that
the synthesis disclosed in the prior art is applicable to the claimed
compound-may show that the chemist was not motivated by the
prior art. If the synthesis disclosed in the prior art is inapplicable
to the claimed compound or is, in fact, the one employed, motiva-
tion by the prior art might be established. Merely showing, how-
ever, that the synthesis disclosed in the prior art is the same as that
employed by the chemist to synthesize the claimed compound
does not conclusively establish the obviousness of the claimed
compound. The simplicity of common synthetic methods and the
availability and expense of starting materials also may dictate the
selection of a given synthetic route.
On at least two occasions, the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals has considered whether variation in the synthetic meth-
ods for the claimed compound and the prior art compound is evi-
dence of nonobviousness. In In re Riden, 133 the court held that
evidence of the variation of synthetic routes should be considered
on the issue of nonobviousness of the claimed compound but
should be accorded little weight. 34 In the later case of In re Hoek-
sema,135 the court held that the complexity or nonobviousness of a
synthesis as evidence of the nonobviousness of the compound
should be given no weight.'36 This court then stated, however,
that such evidence is relevant to the question of whether a method
is patentable. 137 In light of the above discussion, evidence of a
synthetic route different from that disclosed in the prior art should
be considered as evidence rebutting the prima facie showing of
obviousness, as it may prove that the chemist was unmotivated by
the prior art references. 138
132. See Wegner, supra note 126.
133. 318 F.2d 761 (C.C.P.A. 1963). See notes 98-102 supra and accompanying text.
134. Id at 764. The appellants in Riden did not fully develop their arguments. "The
record does not show whether there are other methods, besides appellants', for making the
compounds." Id
135. 379 F.2d 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
136. Id at 1011.
137. Id
138. This view was expressed in In re Grose, 592 F.2d 1161 (C.C.P.A. 1979): "Failure
of the prior art to disclose or render obvious a method for making any composition of
matter, whether a compound or mixture of compounds. . . precludes a conclusion that the
composition would have been obvious." Id at 1168. In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 274
(C.C.P.A. 1968).
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The second factor in determining the motivational issue de-
mands a comparison of the properties possessed by the prior art
compound(s) with the properties of the claimed compounds. The
central question is determining the nature of the relationship be-
tween the properties disclosed in the prior art or possessed by the
prior art compounds and those of the claimed compound. The
courts are divided on the proper method of resolving this ques-
tion. The cases fall into three categories which will be analyzed
individually.
1. Case I
The claimed compound possesses a property not disclosed in
the prior art for the structurally similar prior art compounds. This
broad category encompasses three different fact patterns.
a. The claimed compound possesses a property not disclosed
in the prior art but which is actually possessed by the structurally
similar prior art compound.
The most noted case supporting patentability in this situation
is In re Stemniski. This case held that a prima facie showing of
obviousness is rebuttable by proof that the claimed compound
possesses a significant utility not indicated by the prior art.139 The
rationale for this rule is that the prior art provides no motivation
for the chemist to synthesize the claimed compound because it dis-
closes no utility for the claimed compound.
Despite Stemniski's strong rationale, other cases in the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals have been decided differently."
In each of these cases, the prior art was silent concerning the prop-
erty actually possessed by the prior art compound. In In re Wil-
der, '4 the applicant discovered that the chemical compound (a
rubber additive which retarded deterioration) lacked the skin tox-
icity characteristic of the prior art compounds. The Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals affirmed the board's rejection in
Wilder.'42 Wilder can be rationalized on two grounds. First, one
of the prior art compounds was shown to be a lesser irritant than
the claimed compound. Thus, the appellant could not show any
actual difference between the claimed and prior art compounds.
139. See notes 109-18 supra and accompanying text.
140. See In re Shette, 566 F.2d 81 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Wilder, 563 F.2d 457
(C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Hoch, 428 F.2d 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Mod, 408 F.2d 1055
(C.C.P.A. 1969); In re DeMontmollin, 344 F.2d 976 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
141. 563 F.2d 457 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
142. Id at 461.
974 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:949
Second, the lack of skin toxicity is an insignificant property for a
compound which is used primarily as a rubber additive. 143 The
Wilder line of cases, therefore, stands for the proposition that to
rebut the prima facie showing of obviousness, the claimed com-
pound must have a signffcant, additional property which the prior
art compound lacks.'"
b. The claimed compound possesses a property diametrically
opposed to those properties indicated by prior art disclosures of
structurally similar compounds.
Cases falling into this category generally hold that the com-
pound is patentable. 45  One such case, In re Lambooy,146 in-
volved a claimed compound possessing antivitamin properties
where the prior art contained a homologue of the claimed com-
pound (riboflavin) possessing vitamin properties. The court held
the claimed compound patentable as there was no evidence
"which would lead one skilled in this art to expect that the differ-
ences in the molecular structure between riboflavin and the appel-
lant's compound would cause this difference in properties."' 47
Thus, Lambooy also is consistent with the motivation rationale.14 8
c. The claimed compound possesses a property not disclosed
in the prior art, and there is no comparison between the respective
properties of the prior art and claimed compounds.
143. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals also affirmed the board's rejection in a
similar fact situation where the claimed compound had the singular additional ability, over
similar prior art compounds, to dye cellulose. See In re DeMontmollin, 344 F.2d 976
(C.C.P.A. 1965). The court avoided a Papesch analysis stating, "We do not agree... that
a single variance in the properties of new chemical compounds will necessarily tip the
balance in favor of patentability where otherwise closely related chemical compounds are
involved." Id at 978. Judge Smith's dissent in DeMonirnollin sharply criticized the major-
ity for its avoidance of the Papesch analysis and its hindsight reconstruction of the prior
art. Id at 979. Wilder and DeMontmollin also may be viewed as examples of the court's
employing the quantum of novelty rationale. See notes 65-72 supra and accompanying
text.
144. Additional support for this statement can be found in In re Mod, 408 F.2d 1055
(C.C.P.A. 1969):
Inasmuch as the claimed compounds and those of Bousquet do possess a close
structural relationship and it is not denied that they have a .pec#fc, signffcant
property in common, viz. insecticidal activity, we do not regard the additional
antimicrobial activity discovered by appellants for the claimed compounds suffi-
cient ground to hold that the subject mater as a whole is unobvious.
Id at 1057 (emphasis supplied).
145. See In re Petering, 301 F.2d 676 (C.C.P.A. 1962); In re Lambooy, 300 F.2d 950
(C.C.P.A. 1962).
146. 300 F.2d 950 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
147. Id. at 955.
148. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
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in re Albrecht,149 which is indicative of the cases that follow
Stemniski, suggests that a structurally similar claimed compound
is patentable regardless of whether the prior art compound actu-
ally possesses the property of the claimed compound. The case
further stipulates, however, that such patentability only occurs if
the prior art is silent as to that property. In this regard, the Al-
brecht court stated, "We are of the opinion that a novel chemical
compound can be nonobvious to one having ordinary skill in the
art notwithstanding that it may possess a known property in com-
mon with a known structurally similar compound."1 50 Albrecht,
therefore, is consistent with the Stemniski analysis and the motiva-
tion rationale.'
5
'
In contrast, there are several cases including Wilder, that sup-
port the opposite view. In In re Shetty, 1 2 for example, the court
affirmed the board's rejection of the composition claims for a class
of compounds which curbed animal appetites where the prior art
disclosed structurally similar compounds which combatted micro-
bial infestation. The court stated:
Confronted with.. . evidence of obviousness, appellant has
offered no evidence of unobviousness, as by showing an actual
difference in properties between his compounds and the prior
art compounds. Appellant merely shows that his compounds
are appetite suppressants whereas the reference compounds are
not so known. Further, appellant has not indicated whether his
compounds are antiviral, as is [the] prior art compound. [In
the] absence of comparative evidence... we hold that compo-
sition claim... obvious ... and unpatentable ....
Shetty also is consistent with the quantum of novelty rationale.
The court stated that the minor molecular modification did not
constitute an "appreciable difference" from the prior art com-
pounds and that "a person skilled in chemical and/or pharmaceu-
tical arts would not hesitate to [synthesize the claimed
compound].' 5 4
2. Case 2
The claimed compound possesses the same beneficial property
149. 514 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
150. Id at 1395-96 (emphasis supplied).
151. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text.
152. 566 F.2d 81 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
153. Id at 86.
154. Id The court thought that the similarities of the claimed and prior art com-
pounds, as well as the disclosure of the synthesis of the claimed compound in the prior art,
provided sufficient motivation for the chemist to synthesize the claimed compound. Id
19811
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as that disclosed in the prior art for the structurally similar prior
art compound, but to a different degree.
Although there is language to the contrary in some cases, 155
chemical compounds generally are patentable when the property
they possess is present to an unexpected and greater degree than
that present in the prior art compound. A case representative of
this principle, In re McLamore,156 involved an applicant seeking a
patent on a chemical compound for the oral treatment of diabetes
where the prior art contained a homologue useful for the same
purpose. The court reversed the board's rejection of the com-
pound claim and held that substantially improved results in the
same field of use known in the prior art is evidence to rebut a
showing of prima facie obviousness. 157
McLamore and similar cases 58 are inconsistent with both the
motivation rationale and the holding of Wilder. In McLamore,
the prior art discloses structurally similar compounds with benefi-
cial properties. A person of ordinary skill in the art, however,
knows that small structural modifications may create beneficial
differences in the compound's known properties which, in turn,
may motivate the synthesis of such compounds. Furthermore, the
property which the claimed compound possesses fails to be "addi-
tional;" it is simply present to a greater degree. This line of rea-
soning, therefore, is inconsistent with the Wilder standard which
provides that a prima facie showing of obviousness only will be
rebutted by showing that the claimed compound possesses a sig-
nificant and additional property not possessed by the prior art
compound. 5 9 Thus, the court in McLamore demonstrates the
quantum of novelty rationale. 60 McLamore may be justified fur-
ther by previously discussed policies embraced by the patent
system.' 61
3. Case 3
The prior art discloses both a compound and a proposed mod-
ification for that compound which is expected to be beneficial.
155. See, e.g., In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381 (C.C.P.A. 1963); In re Coes, 173 F.2d 1012
(C.C.P.A. 1949).
156. 379 F.2d 985 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
157. Id at 989-90.
158. Eg., In re Ackermann, 444 F.2d 1172 (C.C.P.A. 1971); In re Lohr, 317 F.2d 388
(C.C.P.A. 1963).
159. See notes 138-44 supra and accompanying text.
160. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text.
161. See notes 48-60 supra and accompanying text.
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The claimed compound is synthesized in accordance with the
prior art proposal.
The general rule in this situation is to deny patentability of the
claimed compound when it possesses the beneficial properties to
the extent predicted. 6 2 The prior art would make the compound
with the proposed modification and its beneficial properties obvi-
ous to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Furthermore, the ex-
pectation that the property would be beneficially modified might
provide the motivation for the synthesis.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, however, has
granted patents on compound claims where the proposed modifi-
cation produced a more beneficial result than was expected. In In
re Blondel,163 for example, the prior art disclosed structurally sim-
ilar compounds to those claimed and suggested that the addition
of longer alkyl chains would significantly enhance the beneficial
property by prolonging the drug's activity.' 6" The applicant in
Blondel synthesized the compound conforming to the suggested
modification and discovered that the compound possessed more
prolonged activity than could have been predicted by the prior art.
The court reversed the board's rejection of the applicant's compo-
sition claim on the basis of this finding. 165
Blondel is inconsistent with cases adopting the motivation ra-
tionale because the prior art references motivated the chemist to
synthesize the longer chain compound with the expectation that
prolonged activity would result. The mere fact that the quantita-
tive prediction of prolonged activity based on the prior art was
surpassed (by 150%) caused the court to find the compound non-
obvious and patentable. 6 6 Thus, Blondel can be viewed either as
a case in which the quantum of novelty rationale supported the
court's opinion or as a case where the underlying policies of the
patent system 67 subverted the statutory scheme.
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS-PROPOSALS
Judicial reliance on either unexpected properties or unantici-
162. See notes 121-27 supra and accompanying text.
163. 499 F.2d 1311 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
164. Id at 1312-14.
165. rd at 1318.
166. Id The court also recognized that a substantial degree of unpredictability in
physical properties results from minor modifications of chemical structure. Id at 1317.
167. See notes 152-65 supra and accompanying text. See also In re Murch, 464 F.2d
1051 (C.C.P.A. 1972) where significant improvement in an obvious combination led to a
patent.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L W REVIEW
pated increases in known properties as indicia of nonobviousness
of a chemical compound may be made obsolete by the current
trends in chemistry. A party attempting to invalidate an oppo-
nent's patent in an infringement proceeding, for example, may
find it easier to argue that a compound exhibits expected results or
possesses predictable properties-factors which have been deemed
virtually conclusive on the issue of obviousness. 168 Furthermore,
quantitative structure-activity and linear free energy relationships
are rapidly becoming useful tools in solving complex chemical
problems. 169 Simply stated, the theory behind such relationships
is that similar modifications of chemical structure will produce
quantitatively similar changes in chemical properties. 170  Al-
though various approaches to these problems exist, some chemists
create mathematical correlations between physical activity and
chemical structures. This approach predicts structures which opti-
mize the advantageous characteristics while minimizing adverse
characteristics under prescribed conditions. ' 7 1
These linear free energy and structure-activity relationships
are potentially revolutionary techniques because of their predic-
tive value in new chemical design. 172 Chemists are no longer ran-
domly synthesizing molecules in the hope that a given molecule
will possess certain characteristics. Using such relationships,
chemists try to synthesize chemical compounds with predictable
characteristics to eliminate the expense and delay of random
searches for new and useful compounds. If such predictions con-
cerning the physical characteristics of unsynthesized compounds
succeed, however, it would be difficult to argue that the com-
pound, once synthesized, exhibits unexpected results. If the cur-
rent judicial standard-accepting proof of "expected" properties
in novel compounds as conclusive evidence of obvi-
ousness-remains unchanged, therefore, then the patentability of
compounds synthesized after such studies would be questionable.
Thus, these recent advances in chemists' approaches to the solu-
168. See notes 120-67 supra and accompanying text.
169. For a general review, see CORRELATION ANALYSIS IN CHEMISTRY (N. Chapman
& J. Shorter eds. 1978).
170. Wold & Sjostrom, Linear Free Energy Relationships as Tools for Investigating
Chemical SimilariQ'-Theory and Practice, in id at 1, 3.
171. AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY ADVANCES IN CHEMISTRY SERIES No. 114, Bio-
LOGICAL CORRELATIONS-THE HANSCH APPROACH vi (1972); Joyner & Purcell, Quantum
Pharmacology and .Quantitative Structure-Activity Relaionshps: 4 Brief Review, in
QUANTITATIVE STRUCTURE-ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS 13, 19 (M. Tichy ed. 1973).
172. 499 F.2d 1311 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
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tion of complex compound design problems may necessitate a
fundamental change in the statutory scheme for the patentability
of chemical compounds.173
Some of the uncertainties in this area would be eliminated if
the courts would adopt a more rigorous analysis. The courts
should first examine carefully the differences between the prior art
and the claimed compounds in a manner analogous to the patent
attorney's examination of the invention at the time it was made
and prior to filing for a patent. If the differences between the
structures and syntheses of the claimed and prior art compounds
are so great that there is no probability the chemist was motivated
by the prior art, the claimed compound should not be deemed ob-
vious. If the prima facie case arises, conversely, because there are
sufficient structural similarities between the prior art and the
claimed compounds to suggest that the chemist was motivated by
the prior art, the court should examine carefully whether there is
any evidence to rebut the prima facie case. The court should de-
termine whether the prior art is silent as to the properties of the
prior art compound and whether the prior art leads the field in the
opposite direction. Finally, if the underlying policies of the patent
system support protection of the invention, the court should relax
the statutory requirements of patentability and articulate its rea-
sons for these less stringent requirements.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under the current interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 103, courts ex-
amine the structural similarities and properties of the claimed and
prior art compounds,1 74 subject to few exceptions. 7 ' If these com-
pounds possess similar structures and a person of ordinary skill in
the art would expect that the properties also would be similar, the
courts examine the unexpected or actual, significant differences in
the properties of the claimed and prior art compounds. 76 The use
of structure activity and linear free energy relationships, however,
is rapidly advancing to the point where chemists can use their
studies of the structures and properties of prior art compounds to
predict with quantitative accuracy the properties of unsynthesized
compounds. 177
173. See notes 91-167 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 86-167 supra and accompanying text.
175. See note 117 supra.
176. See notes 119-67 upra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 168-73 supra and accompanying text.
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The policies of the patent system178 dictate that full composi-
tion of matter patents should be granted for chemical compounds
that are new, useful, and not obvious to a person of ordinary skill
in the art. If the current trends in science and law continue, few
new patents on chemical compounds will issue, existing patents
will be easier to challenge as obvious, and the policies of the pat-
ent system will be defeated.
MICHAEL WILLIS VARY
178. See notes 48-60 supra and accompanying text.
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